



THE OUTSOURCING OF POLICING AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DISSENT: THE ROLE OF NON-STATE POLICING AND SECURITY ACTORS IN THE PURIFICATION OF SPACE DURING THE 2010 G20 SUMMIT PROTESTS IN TORONTO

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ABSTRACT

Since the controversial policing of the 2010 G20 summit protests in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, the state has been criticized for its role in criminalizing dissent. While the role of the public police during these protests is certainly worth examining, this paper suggests that attention should be directed towards non-state policing and security actors to allow for a fuller analysis of how dissent is criminalized. This paper will therefore explore how and why state governance of dissent during mega-events has morphed within a neoliberal, post-9/11 era. In turn, this will allow for a greater understanding of why the state “outsourced” its policing function to non-state entities in preparation for the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto. By making this connection, this would then help to uncover how non-state policing and security actors are active agents in the criminalization of dissent. Moreover, this paper will examine how this shift in the governance of dissent is welcomed by the neoliberal state, as the “outsourcing” of policing helps the state reproduce its sovereignty through the purification of space by non-state actors. This paper will suggest that it is fallacious to assume that non-state actors contribute to the erosion of state sovereignty.

Keywords: *sovereignty, criminalization of dissent, non-state actors, outsourcing, security*

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INTRODUCTION: POLICING CONTROVERSIES AT THE 2010 G20 SUMMIT PROTESTS IN TORONTO

Policing during the 2010 G20 protests in Toronto, Ontario, Canada can simply be described as highly controversial. With over 1,100 people arrested during the course of the summit and with most of the arrestees being released without a criminal charge, the police were staunchly criticized for infringing on civil liberties (Perkel, 2012). Yet, while academics, journalists, civil liberty unions amongst other individuals and organizations have been critical of the state for criminalizing dissent during the G20 summit, the role that non-state actors played in the criminalization of dissent has generally been ignored. This paper will explore how and why state governance of dissent during mega-events has been reconfigured within a neoliberal, post-9/11 era. In doing so, it will then be possible to understand why the neoliberal Canadian state, to use neoliberal jargon, “outsourced” its policing function to private, non-state policing and security entities during the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto. By examining the outsourcing of policing, this paper will also illustrate the ways in which private actors and security technologies help the state to police, manage, suppress and ultimately criminalize dissent.

Moreover, while this paper will explore why and how private actors are contracted by the state, this paper will also examine how this shift in governance is actually welcomed by the state. With the state being reorganized and its authority being limited to serve the free market under the current neoliberal political order, the state has not been able to exercise full governance over its territory (Cheliotis, 2015: p. 32; Harvey, 2012: p. 23). The production of order through the purification of space has thus become an integral feature of state sovereignty as states respond to deterritorialization under neoliberal globalization (Cheliotis, 2015: p. 32; Smith and Low, 2006: p. 1-2). As such, there has been a misconception that private security erodes state sovereignty and the state’s monopoly over the means of violence and that in turn the state should be weary of these non-state actors. However, this is not necessarily the case. The governance of dissent through non-state actors arguably allows state power to flourish in bodies and technologies that are seen to be separate from the state. In turn, with non-state actors aiding in the purification of space through the criminalization of dissent, the state is able to restore aspects of its sovereignty under a neoliberal regime. The outsourcing of policing during mega-events, such as the G20 summit in Toronto, can be seen to not hinder, but actually help the state’s ability to reproduce its sovereign authority over its territory.

While the vociferous criticisms about the police quashing civil liberties during the G20 summit in Toronto is justifiable, this can also be problematic as it obscures the private nature of policing involved in regulating public space during these events. Conservative estimates suggest that there are around 140,000 licensed private security actors, whereas, in comparison, as of 2015 there are approximately 68,777 active public police officers (Mazowita and Greenland, 2016: p. 3; Nalla and Wakefield, 2014: p. 728). Thus, with the amount of non-state private policing actors doubling the size of the public police, it would be fallacious to only examine the role of state agencies in the criminalization of dissent. It is therefore crucial to account for this shift in governance and the role of non-state actors to have a more complete analysis of how and why dissent is governed during

mega-events, like the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto.

THE OUTSOURCING OF POLICING: A NEOLIBERAL PARADIGM SHIFT IN THE GOVERNANCE OF DISSENT?

The emplacement of security measures for the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto was an extensive state-led project and at the time it was widely reported that the budget for security surpassed \$1 billion dollars (Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2012: p. 249). Non-state policing and security actors were also included in this budget as the RCMP wanted to hire private security who would be outfitted with technologies such as “X-ray belt driven scanners” and “hand-held metal detectors” to provide “airport-style security at various checkpoints” (Freeze, 2010). A contract was eventually awarded to Contemporary Security Canada after they were selected by Public Works and Government Services Canada and the RCMP to provide security screening services (Wallace, 2010). Besides this contract, the RCMP contracted SNC-Lavalin to help provide security through environmental design, as SNC-Lavalin was given \$9.4 million to erect a 10 kilometre fence around the downtown G20 security zone, with the RCMP also giving them input on how the fence should be designed (O’Neil, 2010). With the several ways non-state policing and security actors were contracted to provide security during the G20 summit, it would seem that they were considered by the state to be pertinent to produce some form of order during the G20 summit. But the question is, why did these state organizations, like the RCMP, feel that it had to divest part of the already large \$1 billion dollar budget to non-state policing and security actors in order to produce security?

To begin, and in order to make sense of why non-state actors were contracted to aid in the criminalization of dissent, it would be helpful to start this analysis with an examination of how the current neoliberal political climate has affected state governance. As explained by Foucault (2008), during the post-war era, members of the liberal school of thought connected various social defects with an enlarged state intervening within the market economy (p. 115-116). Due to this analysis of the state by liberals, there was an inversion of the state’s role under neoliberalism; whereby under liberalism the state supervised the free market, under neoliberalism, the free market became the organizing and guiding principle of the state (Foucault, 2008: p. 116-117). Current state governance practices and policies are thus a reflection of the free market organizing, guiding and ultimately “supervising” the state. For instance, state governance over the economy has been reengineered to *re-regulate* the economy for the benefit of corporations while “corrective” and “constructive” measures have been implemented to support and expand the free market (Wacquant, 2012: p. 72). Similarly, state governance over its citizenry is also demonstrative of the free market supervising the state, as the state has an integral role in disciplining its citizenry to participate in the free market. For example, Wacquant (2012) notes how the neoliberal state must also redress and reform the behavioural and moral choices of welfare recipients through cultural indoctrination and bureaucratic oversight in order to discipline them to accept employment in precarious jobs as a prerequisite for receiving welfare entitlements (p. 72). With the free market supervising the state under neoliberalism, the free market has contributed to the further subversion of state governance

as the state has become preoccupied with expanding the free market by revamping how it governs its citizenry and the economy.

With many aspects of state governance being reconfigured under neoliberalism to ensure the growth and sustainability of the free market, it would seem that state sovereignty has been undermined. As a consequence, it is not surprising that this paradigmatic shift in state governance has also affected and congealed the state's penal and policing functions. In his work, Zygmunt Bauman (2000) mentions that there is a peculiar global phenomenon whereby state expenditures for police services and prisons have substantially increased (p. 212). He posits that the increase in expenditures for policing and prisons can be attributed to the fact that because states cannot claim to effectively regulate market forces or support the welfare of its citizens under a neoliberal political paradigm, states have become "oversized police precincts" as they must demonstrate their usefulness to their citizens by providing security through crime-fighting policies (Bauman, 2000: p. 216). This would suggest that with the free market imposing limits on how the state can govern its citizens and the economy, this has resulted in the state seeking out alternative ways to govern its citizens, since its economic authority over its citizens has been undermined under a neoliberal political regime. To combat its impotency, the state has sought to reassert its sovereignty in other realms of governance and reconfigure itself as an institution that, to use more neoliberal jargon, can be "invested" in by its citizens since it produces security and reproduces order through its penal and policing functions.

Luckily for the state, the increased usage of its penal and policing apparatuses under neoliberalism has been widely accepted by its citizens, as its citizens have provided the state with the material and symbolic "investments" needed to support a punitive form of state governance. Since neoliberal governments have promised and allowed for flexible labour conditions and the extraterritoriality of market forces under the re-regulation of the economy to support and expand the free market, citizens increasingly feel insecure and uncertain about their future (Bauman, 2000: 214). As such, it was a "happy coincidence" that these feelings of insecurity and uncertainty, which became more extensive due to neoliberal governance, have been misconstrued as an anxiety around personal safety (Bauman, 2000: 214). The mass circulation and mobilization of this anxiety around personal safety in turn helps to "seduce all of us into the fold of the state" since violent state practices, such as imprisonment, militarization and tightened border controls, have been "offered as antidotes to the precarities and insecurities of the contemporary neoliberal political order" to anyone who embraces these state practices (Agathangelou, Bassichis and Spira, 2008: p. 122; Lambie, 2013: p. 231). Neoliberal states are thus able to gain "investments" from their citizens for this punitive mode of state governance since their citizens, feeling insecure and uncertain about their future under a neoliberal political paradigm and understanding these feelings as the result of the lack of personal safety, have turned to the state for more safety and security.

It appears as though that neoliberal state governance now employs a sort of "supply and demand" logic since to "supply" its crime control and security measures and in order to present itself as a useful institution, it must have a "demand" from its citizens to fight crime. Fortunately for the neoliberal state, it can continue to demonstrate its usefulness and gain these "investments" from its citizenry through the demand to produce security in the post-9/11 era. According to Bauman

(2000), when new, extremely repulsive and seemingly omnipresent crimes gain public attention and a new government campaign is launched to police and repress this crime, the state is seen as a necessary institution by its citizens (p. 215). It was thus a “happy coincidence” (Bauman, 2000: 214) that the fear of terrorism by citizens in various post-9/11 nation-states helped to legitimize the state as an important institution under this contemporary neoliberal political paradigm. In post-9/11 Canada, an insecurity discourse emerged wherein the vulnerability of the Canadian state was constantly explained to Canadians by security experts through the media in order to justify a new national security agenda for the protection of Canadian citizens against terrorism (Murphy, 2007: p. 451-452). Due to information being relayed about the inability of the Canadian state to provide adequate security, the Canadian public accepted, supported and even demanded that fiscal, legal and institutional reforms be made in order to secure Canada (Murphy, 2007: p. 452). Public policing in the contemporary security climate in Canada was therefore able to incorporate the simple security logic of, “better safe than sorry”, in order to rationalize new and invasive public police powers to prevent terrorism and produce security (Murphy, 2007: p. 456). With these hegemonic discourses around terrorism and the inability for the Canadian state to secure the public, it would seem that many citizens in turn “invested” in the state to address this newfound insecurity by demanding reforms. The state was thus reformatted as a necessary institution by its citizens in a post-9/11 neoliberal political paradigm.

The emergence of these discourses around insecurity and terrorism post-9/11 and the “investments” into the state’s punitive apparatuses has had consequential implications for state governance of dissent. Expressions of dissent have been increasingly conflated with terrorism and subsequently targeted and criminalized by the neoliberal state. In her work, Starr (2006) notes how there has been a peculiar shift in which property crime has been discursively reconfigured as a form of terrorism (p. 62). In turn, activists who may engage in property crime have now been reclassified as potential terrorists while protest events are now believed to be the “choice platforms for terrorist attacks” (Starr, 2006: p. 74). The consequence of expressions of dissent being reinterpreted as a form of terrorism is that it has rationalized neoliberal state governance that criminalizes dissent. Starr (2006) adamantly states that the discursive re-articulation of dissent as a form of terrorism has resulted in activists, protestors, social organizers and practically anyone who expresses dissent to be more likely to be subjected to police surveillance and sentencing (p. 74-75). This logic that configures property crime as terrorism and dissenters as terrorists can be seen with how the public police interpreted the protestors during the G20 summit in Toronto. In *Policing the Right to Protest: G20 Systemic Review Report*, the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) reported how the night shift Incident Commander constantly invoked the word “terrorists” to describe and rationalize the criminalization of protestors in order to stop property crime during the summits (2012: p. 40). From this example, it appears that the discursive manipulation of property crime as a form of terrorism and the re-evaluation of protest events as platforms for terrorist attacks by the state has allowed members of the state to justify the criminalization of dissent during the G20 protests in Toronto.

However, while the criminalization of dissent to “fight” terrorism has revitalized the importance of the repressive functions of the state under neoliberalism, it has inadvertently led to

an overreliance on privatized policing. In fact, as noted by Murphy (2007), this adoption of a security mandate has led to a highly coordinated system between state departments and private sector agencies (p. 466-467). Since the state must solidify its existence under neoliberalism by showing its citizens that it produces security, it would seem counterproductive for the state to employ the services of non-state policing actors to help with their security mandate. Yet, the reason for the outsourcing of policing and the contracting of private security can be understood as an inevitable result from the construction of dissent as a form of “terrorist risk”. As stated by Ericson and Doyle (2003), risk is the probability that threats or dangers linked with individuals, technologies or nature will lead to unfortunate consequences for an individual or group of individuals (p. 2). Expert knowledge on risk in turn informs individuals on how to manage their conduct to prevent harmful consequences (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: p. 86). With the conflation of expressions of dissent, like property damage, with terrorism, it is possible to interpret that expressions of dissent are seen by the neoliberal state as risks that need to be managed.

The outcome of the emergence of these risk discourses is that these discourses actually generate a perpetual loop of insecurity. Within a risk society, there is a constant demand for more security, which leads to the creation of more risk knowledge to manage and govern risk accordingly; however, this simultaneously produces more insecurity as the constant focus on danger leads to perpetual doubt that the danger has been counteracted, which in turn erodes the public’s sense of security (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: p. 85-86). This would indicate that risk knowledge on security is inherently paradoxical. While it determines how individuals and institutions should manage their behaviour, it indirectly causes an unending state of fear and the need for new risk knowledge. Due to the sense of insecurity created by these risk discourses, the state can never fully ensure the security of its citizens. This implies that the state must acknowledge that despite its larger punitive authority over its citizens, it cannot truly provide total security for its population and as a result, it must form alliances with non-state actors to produce security (Garland, 2001: p. 173). However, due to the ceaseless connection between risk and insecurity, even with its partnership with non-state policing and security agencies, the state still cannot produce a totalizing feeling of security. Thus, while the neoliberal state has an enlarged punitive apparatus, the production of risk knowledge means that the neoliberal state must partner itself with non-state security and policing actors in order to attempt to produce security.

This feedback loop of risk and insecurity can then rationalize the outsourcing of policing during protest events. For example, prior to the G20 summit, public police officers covertly infiltrated activist groups to determine the level of threat that each group posed (Monaghan and Walby, 2012: p. 660). This consequently led to an extensive list of individuals being monitored, as activists just attending public meetings to coordinate buses were seen as security risks (Monaghan and Walby, 2012: p. 660). From this example, it appears that attempts to securitize the city helped to produce more insecurity; as the state sought to create risk knowledge of the protestors, more protestors became constructed as security risks. Due to the amplification of activists and dissenters as security risks, it is not surprising that in the *2011 Spring Report of the Auditor General*, it was reported that the RCMP contracted \$34 million worth of private security, “mostly due to a shortage of police personnel” (p. 21). The continuous production of risk knowledge on dissent and terrorism means

the neoliberal state simply does not have (and never will have) enough personnel required to govern dissent and will have to seek help from private sector security agencies. Put this way, it makes sense why the state had a large \$1 billion dollar budget to securitize the G20 summit and why millions of those dollars were spent contracting private security firms and companies; the state was insecure about its ability to provide security without these non-state actors.

THE PRODUCTION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY: THE PURIFICATION OF SPACE BY NON-STATE ACTORS DURING MEGA-EVENTS

Considering that the current neoliberal political paradigm means that the free market supervises, morphs, and even limits how the state could govern, the outsourcing of policing may appear, at first, as another instance whereby the state relinquishes its responsibilities to the free market. However, the outsourcing of policing may actually help the state to control its sovereignty as it allows state power to be exercised through these private policing agencies. This can be attributed to the Weberian notion that the state, as a sovereign entity, has a monopoly on the means of violence within its territory (Weber, 1919/1991: p. 78). According to Neocleous (2003), control over a territory by a state is necessary in order for the state to establish its sovereignty (p. 100). In turn, the state must enact violence to both control its territory and delineate its borders (Neocleous, 2003: p. 102). Once this process is completed, the state then has a monopoly over the means of violence and many forms of violence conducted by the state become seen as legitimate and necessary (Neocleous, 2003: p. 102). When privatized policing agencies are contracted by the state to provide security within its territory, these non-state actors are permitted to engage in certain forms of violence since many of their actions are legitimized under the state's monopoly of violence, but only under the direct oversight of public officials. The contracting of privatized policing services therefore does not necessarily make the state more redundant under a neoliberal political paradigm, even though the state derives most of its authority from its policing and penal functions. Instead, contracting out this function allows state power to manifest itself and flourish through the bodies of non-state security actors. This in turn results in the state reassuring its importance as a punitive institution despite its subordination to the free market in other areas of governance. While the state is obliged to re-regulate its economy for the support and expansion of the free market under neoliberalism, since only the state can engage in violence to provide security, non-state security actors within the free market become dependent on the state's authority to be allowed to operate. Furthermore, since the elusive goal of security can never be fully attained due to the notion of incalculable risk, the need for these privatized policing actors is insatiable as they must constantly be contracted. Thus, a cycle of privatized policing agencies dependent on state power is established.

To briefly exemplify this relationship between the state and private policing and security actors, it should be noted how these non-state actors can be subjected to criminalization for enacting violence without state authority. As noted by Walby and Lippert (2015), laws that regulate private security, like the *Private Security and Investigative Services Act* in Ontario, are meant to outline what tasks private security can and cannot perform and to standardize the private security industry by

ensuring that private security actors are properly trained in regards to the “use of force” (p. 42-43). Due to licensing and regulations imposed by the state onto non-state policing and security actors, it would appear that the state retains a monopoly over the means of violence as these private security entities are dependent on the state to operate. The failure to achieve a license and to thus be granted approval from the state to engage in violence can result in these non-state actors being criminalized. For instance, Contemporary Security Canada, one of the private security firms contracted by the RCMP during the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto, was charged for providing security services while being unlicensed and employing an unlicensed security guard (McLean, 2011). From this example, it would appear that the neoliberal state is willing to ensure its monopoly over the means of violence as it is willing to bar private security actors from selling their services within the free market if they are not first permitted by the state to engage in violence. State power can therefore be seen to permeate through these non-state security actors as non-state security personnel who engage in violence are doing so through the conditional permission and non-negotiable rules and laws laid out by the state.

The contracting of these non-state agencies to exercise state power during mega-events may mean that these non-state actors actually aid in the criminalization of dissent as they demarcate spaces where protesters can congregate to express their dissent. Kitchen and Rygiel (2014) trace how the production of security has resulted in a view that rather than waging war elsewhere and with other states, the state must find and subsequently mobilize against non-state civilian threats within city spaces (p. 204-205). Since dissent was reconfigured as a form of terrorism and thus a risk to order during the G20 summit in Toronto, individuals who expressed dissent were viewed by the state as threats within city spaces who must be found and criminalized. Since protestors represent risks to security and evoke fear, this can lead to a “legitimate” purification of city space as they are targeted for removal from these spaces by the state (Kitchen and Rygiel, 2014: p. 205). The securitization of the city during mega-events consequently means that the spaces where dissent can be expressed are limited, which can be enforced and imposed through the state’s hiring of private security.

During the G20 summit in Toronto, the purification of city space and the criminalization of dissent was enforced by non-state policing actors working in conjunction with the state. At a designated security zone, a fence was erected by SNC-Lavalin, a private security company, while beyond the fence a “traffic zone” was established to regulate the flow of individuals entering and leaving the area (Kitchen and Rygiel, 2014: p. 210). In this space, another private security company was contracted to provide security personnel. Additionally, anyone within five metres of the fence could be required to provide identification to either private security or a member of the public police (Kitchen and Rygiel, 2014: p. 211; Renzi and Elmer, 2013: p. 57). As stated by Toronto Police Chief Bill Blair, this strategy was employed to “keep the criminals out” (Renzi and Elmer, 2013: p. 57). From this example, it appears that non-state policing and security actors had a significant role in enforcing the purification of dissent from city spaces during the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto. First, since this strategy was employed to prevent the entry of “criminals” into the security zone, it would appear that dissent was discursively conflated with criminality. In turn, the deployment of this discursive tactic by Toronto Police Chief Bill Blair ultimately meant that dissenters were to be

considered risks to security, since allowing dissenters to enter into the security zone would risk possible criminal behaviour, like property crime. As such, the need to produce security and minimize risk in this space legitimized the role that private security played in regulating the flow of individuals entering and leaving the security perimeter. Not only does this show that these non-state actors operate through state power, but it also shows that these non-state security actors must accept the state's definitions of criminality and risk during mega-events as it is through these definitions in which they engage in the purification of dissent. The purification of city space during the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto therefore demonstrates that non-state actors work with the state to help regulate, manage and even suppress where dissent can be expressed.

Additionally, through the purification of dissent from these city spaces by these non-state agencies, the state can reaffirm its sovereignty during a mega-event. In his work, Neocleous (2003) explains that when a state establishes its sovereignty over a territory, political rivals are not allowed to coexist within this territory since they explicitly challenge state sovereignty (p. 98). Yet, given that there has been a paradigmatic shift in which the free market supervises the state and as such the state cannot govern extraterritorial market forces, the free market seems to have undermined aspects of state sovereignty since the state no longer has full governance authority over its territory. The next choice for the state under this contemporary neoliberal political order would be to target a political rival that is more tangible than deterritorializing market forces in order to symbolically assert its sovereignty. Furthermore, since states are internationally scrutinized during mega-events, a state hosting a mega-event has an ideal opportunity and platform to showcase its strength as an institution by reasserting its sovereignty. The purification of dissenters from city spaces during mega-events can be understood as the state symbolically regaining its sovereign authority over its territory since its dissenters and protestors have been conceptualized as "political rivals" through risk assessments, who can either be removed or regulated through state power. With private security actors being employed to demarcate these spaces and manage risks, these non-state actors actually helped to reproduce state sovereignty as they ensured that the state's political rivals would not be able to express dissent within these purified city spaces. This further illustrates that the outsourcing of policing to private security actors does not detract from state authority, but actually enhances it.

STUDYING NON-STATE SECURITY ACTORS: WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

With this analysis, it is reasonable to argue that private police agencies are critical for helping the state securitize city space, manage dissent and reproduce state sovereignty during mega-events. However, despite the state's heavy reliance on private police forces in producing security, primary focus amongst scholars and journalists during mega-events, like the G20 summit in Toronto, has been directed at the state. This is primarily due to how private policing has been conceptualized. Since state sovereignty is contingent on the state having a monopoly on the means of violence, there is a common misconception that private security erodes state sovereignty and that the state no longer has a monopoly on violence (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007: p. 238). This misconception that private policing is a threat to state sovereignty is therefore very limiting as it

observes how the state is dependent on these private actors to manage dissent and enhance its sovereignty, as well as how these private actors are dependent on state power to operate. Since these seemingly “independent” actors manage dissent through the state’s monopoly on the means of violence, it would be more beneficial to reconfigure these private security actors as complicit in the state governance of dissent in a post-9/11 neoliberal political order. Otherwise, the value of these private actors to the state for the purposes of purifying city space and reproducing state sovereignty may remain invisible if it is believed that only the state can reproduce its sovereignty through the criminalization of dissent. Further research should be directed to uncovering how non-state policing and security agencies interact and work with the state to criminalize dissent.

CONCLUSION

The contracting of private, non-state policing and security actors during the G20 summit in Toronto to aid in the governance of dissent can therefore be understood as the result of the state being reorganized under a post-9/11 neoliberal political order. With the state focusing on the growth and sustainability of the free market, the practices and policies of the neoliberal state have made its citizens more insecure and uncertain about their futures. As such, it was a “happy coincidence” for the neoliberal state that these insecurities collapsed into fears about personal safety, as violent and punitive state practices could be “invested” in by its citizens as solutions to these insecurities. Moreover, with the rise of insecurity discourses in post-9/11 Canada, many citizens provided the material and symbolic investments needed for the neoliberal state as they demanded reforms be made in order to deal with these insecurities and produce a sense of security. However, this has meant that the state has become reliant on contracting non-state policing and security agencies to help provide security, especially in regards to the securitization of mega-events, like the G20 summit in Toronto, since it does not have a sufficient amount of public policing resources needed to provide security at these large scale events. With dissent being conceptualized as a terrorist “risk” under this political paradigm and since the production of security inadvertently exacerbates feelings of insecurities through the production of risk knowledge on a particular danger, the state has turned to the private policing and security sector in order to attempt to produce a sense of security. The governance of dissent has thus undergone a paradigmatic shift as private, non-state security and policing actors now help to regulate, manage, suppress and possibly even criminalize dissent.

The contracting of non-state, private policing and security actors to help produce security during mega-events in turn may have had a beneficial outcome for the neoliberal state. Due to the state holding a monopoly on the means of violence within its territory, these non-state actors are dependent on the state to operate. As such, state power can be seen to operate through the bodies and technologies of non-state actors. With the state being under the supervision of the market and thus unable to have full sovereign control over its territory, the targeting and criminalization of dissenters or “political rivals” during a mega-event allows the state to reassert its sovereignty over its territory on a world stage. Thus, viewing these non-state policing agencies as threats to state sovereignty can be a misconception since it does not capture the fact that private policing actors

helped to secure and reproduce Canadian state sovereignty during the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto. It would therefore be more effective and accurate to understand private policing as an extension of the state's repressive institutions due to the fact that they both aid in the criminalization of dissent and enhance state authority over a territory under the current neoliberal political paradigm.

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